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ABSTRACT
Recent reports have confirmed damage to five of the six Syrian world heritage sites during the
current armed conflict as well as extensive looting of several of its archaeological sites on the
Syrian Tentative List of world heritage. This article examines the role and fate of Syrian world
cultural heritage from the beginning of the conflict, maps out the different cultural property
obligations applicable to Syria while illustrating, where possible, how they may have been
violated. Then, it assesses if and how those responsible for these acts can be prosecuted and
punished. The analysis reveals an accountability gap concerning crimes against Syrian world
cultural heritage. As such, the article proposes to reinstate the debate over crimes against
common cultural heritage which once arose in the context of the Buddhas of Bamiyan.
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INTRODUCTION
In a recent speech, US Secretary of State John Kerry labelled the destruction of heritage in Syria “a
purposeful final insult”1 which is “stealing the soul of millions.”2 He referred to the devastation in
the Ancient City of Aleppo (a declared world heritage site), and to the extensive looting of Apamea
and Dura Europos (on the Syrian Tentative List of world heritage) as a tragedy for the Syrian
people and the rest of the world, and remarked: “How shocking and historically shameful it would
be if we did nothing while the forces of chaos rob the very cradle of our civilization.”3
World cultural heritage is, by definition, of “outstanding universal value”4 and thus constitutes
the finest category of tangible cultural property on land. As such, what happens to Syrian world
heritage sites is often referred to separately from the rest of cultural objects. For example, a
common statement by United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Director-General Irina Bokova, and Joint
Special Representative for Syria Lakhdar Brahimi concerning Syria’s cultural property drew attention
first and foremost to the fact that “[w]orld heritage sites ha[d] suffered considerable and
sometimes irreversible damage.”5 Likewise, the UN Security Council Resolution 2139 (2014) called
on all parties to the Syrian conflict to “save Syria’s rich societal mosaic and cultural heritage, and
take appropriate steps to ensure the protection of Syria’s World Heritage Sites.”6 In the same vein,
the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) recently published two reports
based on satellite imagery assessing the current status of Syrian declared and tentative world
heritage sites respectively.7
Based on the information provided by different sources, it is safe to say some world heritage
sites, or at least some of its components, are irrevocably lost. “How shocking and historically
shameful it would be if we did nothing,”8 Kerry said. But what can be done based on the current
legal framework as applied to Syria?
One way to react to the alleged looting, damage and destruction of Syrian cultural heritage is
through individual criminal responsibility. As we shall see, several of the international conventions
to which Syria is a party introduce the possibility of instituting criminal proceedings for those that
commit cultural heritage violations. To this we need to add the Syrian Antiquities Law of
26 October 1963 passed under Decree, Law No. 222 (Syrian Antiquities Law) and the Chautauqua
Blueprint, a draft statute for a would-be Syrian Extraordinary Tribunal,9 both of which include
crimes concerning cultural objects. However, despite this web of legal instruments, the analysis of
the cultural property obligations applicable to the Syrian armed conflict in sections 2 and 3 shows
that the basis to prosecute those who have looted, damaged or destroyed Syrian world cultural
heritage sites are either absent, due to the overall lack of implementation of international cultural
heritage conventions, or insufficient, due to the fact that international criminal law is in its infancy.
For example, as shown in section 3.4, the article of the Chautauqua Blueprint concerning cultural
objects is unable to express the facts and degrees of wrongdoing when crimes involve world
heritage sites.
1John Kerry, Remarks at Threats to Cultural Heritage in Iraq and Syria Event, (Sept. 22, 2014) available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/09/231992.htm
2Id.
3Id.
4See Convention Concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage, art. 1, Nov. 16, 1972, 1037 U.N.
T.S. 151.
5Statement by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, UNESCO Director-General Irina Bokova and UN and League of
Arab States Joint Special Representative for Syria Lakhdar Brahimi: The destruction of Syria’s cultural heritage must
stop, (Mar. 12, 2014) [hereinafter Common Statement], available at http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?
nid¼7521
6S.C, Res. 2139, { 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2139 (Feb. 22, 2014).
7AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE, Ancient History, Modern Destruction: Assessing the Current
Status of Syria’s World Heritage Sites Using High-Resolution Satellite Imagery (Washington, D.C. Sep. 2014)
[hereinafter AAAS Report], available at http://www.aaas.org/page/ancient-history-modern-destruction-assessing-
current-status-syria-s-world-heritage-sites-using. The second report concerning sites on the Syrian Tentative List is
available at http://www.aaas.org/page/ancient-history-modern-destruction-assessing-status-syria-s-tentative-world-
heritage-sites-7#Dura-Europos.
8Kerry, supra note 1.
9INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM – SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY, “Chautauqua Blueprint” to Prosecute Syrian
War Crimes Unveiled (Oct. 3, 2013), available at http://insct.syr.edu/chautauqua-blueprint-prosecute-syrian-war-crimes-
unveiled/
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The destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan in 2001, led UNESCO and some scholars to espouse
the notion of crimes against culture or crimes against the common heritage of humanity.10
It appears that this so-called crime did little more than express the general outcry of the
international community at the time. This article concludes suggesting that, now that these acts of
destruction have become systematic in the Arab and Sahel regions—and thus we may speak of a
“Bamiyanisation” phenomenon—the concept of crime against cultural heritage should be carried
through in order to solve or at least reduce the current accountability gap.
1. THE SYRIAN ARMED CONFLICT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE COUNTRY’S CULTURAL HERITAGE
Syria has witnessed the rise and fall of several civilisations, among them the Arameans, the
Phoenicians, and the Romans, all of which left their imprint on its territory in the form of what is
called today “cultural heritage.”11 Ever since Syria gained independence from France in 1946, it has
followed a pattern of political instability marked by several coups, as well as the Six-Day War,
where it lost part of its territory (the Golan Heights) to Israel. Prior to the current civil war, the
Ba’ath party had been in charge of the country for several decades; first under Hafez Al-Assad,
and since 2000, under the rule of his son, Bashar Al-Assad. Although the majority of the members
of the current government are Alawite, a division within the Shia Muslims, and the majority of the
population is Sunni, religious differences did not spark the Syrian conflict. Instead, the Arab
Spring, which began in early 2011 in Tunisia and spread later to Egypt, inspired the predominantly
young Syrian population to demand political changes from the Bashar Al-Assad regime.
What began as a social uprising then escalated into a full-blown non-international armed conflict
by July 2012.12
With the precedent of the war in Iraq, it was clear that the cultural heritage of neighbouring
Syria was also at risk. It has been claimed that the difference with Syria lies in its scale of built
heritage scattered throughout its territory.13 Syria is, so to speak, “an open-air museum,”14 that is
directly exposed to all possible dangers arising from armed conflict. In addition, as the Syrian
Directorate General of Antiquities and Museums (DGAM) has acknowledged, it is difficult to ensure
“the protection of the immovable heritage in the country, especially for those archaeological and
world heritage sites that are located in conflict areas and cannot be accessed.”15
Syria has six declared world heritage sites, all of which were included on the List of World
Heritage in Danger by the World Heritage Committee in 2013,16 namely: the Ancient City of
Damascus, the Ancient City of Bosra, the Site of Palmyra, the Ancient City of Aleppo, Crac des
Chevaliers and Qal’at Salah El-Din, as well as the Ancient Villages of Northern Syria. With the
exception of Damascus, damage has been confirmed in all other five sites.17 To this, we need to
add twelve properties that are part of the so-called Tentative List, including the Ebla, Apamea,
Dura Europos, and Mari sites, where extensive looting has also been documented.18
One of the first world heritage sites to have fallen prey of the war, and so far the one where the
most extensive damage has been reported, is the Ancient City of Aleppo. In August 2012 the
presidential forces reportedly took control of its Citadel to the sound of “Bashar or we burn the
10See Francesco Bandarin, Editorial, THE WORLD HERITAGE NEWSLETTER, May-June. 2001, at 1; and Francesco
Francioni & Federico Lenzerini, The Destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan and International Law, 14 Eur. J. Int’l L.
619, 621 (2003).
11This article uses the terms “cultural property” and “cultural heritage” indistinctively.
12International Committee of the Red Cross, “Syria: ICRC and Syrian Arab Red Crescent maintain aid effort amid
increased fighting” (Jul. 17, 2012) available at: https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/update/2012/syria-
update-2012-07-17.htm.
13Interview with Michael Danti, Looting Antiquities, A Fundamental Part of ISIS’ Revenue Stream (Sep. 29, 2014)
available at http://www.npr.org/2014/09/29/352538352/looting-antiquities-a-fundamental-part-of-isis-revenue-stream.
14Cheikhmous Ali, Syrian Heritage Under Threat, 1 Journal Of Eastern Mediterranean Archaeology & Heritage
Studies 351 (2013).
15UNESCO, Regional training on Syrian cultural heritage: addressing the issue of illicit trafficking, Final report and
Recommendations (Amman, Feb. 10–13, 2013) 6, available at http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/
FIELD/Amman/pdf/20130322_Report_Syria_workshop_FINAL.pdf.
16See World Heritage Committee, Convention Concerning The Protection Of The World Cultural And Natural
Heritage 114 (UNESCO, WHC-13/37.COM/7B.Add, May 2013).
17See AAAS Report, supra note 7.
18See generally, Jesse Casana & Mitra Panahipour, Satellite-Based Monitoring of Looting and Damage to
Archaeological Sites in Syria, 2 Journal Of Eastern Mediterranean Archaeology And Heritage Studies 128 (2014).
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country down.”19 According to existing information, the Ancient City’s medieval market (Souq
al-Madina) has been burned to the ground, the main gate of the Great Umayyad Mosque
completely destroyed, and the outer wall of the Citadel extensively damaged.20 Crac des
Chevaliers, situated near the city of Homs on the border with Lebanon, is (or was) the largest
Christian military fortification in the “Holy Land,” where crusaders would seek refuge in the Middle
Ages.21 After continuous armed clashes, the castle was bombarded during the summer of 2013
and some parts reduced to rubble.22 The DGAM state of conservation report of 2014 notes that
some of Palmyra’s remains have been shelled and that, in the Ancient Villages in Northern Syria,
(also known as the “Dead Cities”) there have been illegal excavations and looting, as well as use
of stone statues in al-Qatora as training targets and sniper posts.23 In the Ancient City of Bosra
“[c]lashes had caused damage to the Mabrak el-Naqa building and Nymph Temple, The mosque of
Omari, The Saint-Serge Cathedral, al-Fatemi mosque, Medresat Abu Al-Fidaa, as well as some old
houses in the town itself at the north and east of the amphitheatre.”24
The World Heritage Centre, the International Council of Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), and the
International Centre for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments (ICCROM) have reached
the conclusion that, in some places, the extent of the damage is such that the outstanding
universal value of these sites, a feature that is necessary for these properties to retain the special
status of world heritage, may have been permanently compromised.25
Given that the Syrian conflict was initially motivated by irreconcilable views on the political
make-up of the country, the damage caused to its cultural property was mostly a direct
consequence of the heat of battle, as well as the general breakdown of the rule of law that
accompanies armed conflicts. However, as the months have gone by, the situation has
degenerated into a sectarian conflict. Sunni extremist groups joined the rebels hoping to oppose
the secular regime espoused by Bashar Al-Assad until they managed to hijack the conflict in a
considerable part of the territory.26 Hence the proclamation of an “Islamic State” spaning Syria and
Iraq by ISIS, an al-Qaeda splinter group.
The Islamic State aims to establish a new caliphate based on religious authority where, among
other things, the hands of thieves will be cut off, women will only be allowed to leave their homes
when strictly necessary, fully-covered and, as the chilling detonation of the shrine of Prophet
Younis (Jonas Tomb) in Mosul shows,27 the traces of “infidel” cultural and religious heritage will be
erased.
As the conflict has grown into a religious one between Sunnis and Shiites, the nature of the
danger to which the built cultural heritage is exposed has acquired a whole new dimension:
cultural heritage is now liable to become a central target in the Syrian conflict for ideological
reasons. Ban Ki-Moon, Irina Bokova, Lakhdar Brahimi have already taken stock of this turn as they
have pointed out that there are alarming reports showing that human representations in art are
19Laila M. Rey, La Ciudadela de Alepo, Dañada por la Artillería Siria, EL MUNDO, Aug. 10, 2012, available at http://
www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2012/08/10/internacional/1344592069.html. The article contains a link to a video showing
the moment in which the Syrian army enters the Citadel of Aleppo.
20Syrian Directorate General of Museums & Antiquities, State Party Report: State of Conservation of the Syrian
Cultural Heritage Sites, 1–28 (2014), [hereinafter DGAM 2014 Report] available at http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/21/
documents/; see also, Silvia Perini & Emma Cunliffe, Towards a protection of the Syrian cultural heritage: A summary
of the international responses (March 2011 - March 2014) (Girona: Heritage for Peace, 2014) available at http://www.
heritageforpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Towards-a-protection-of-the-Syrian-cultural-heritage.pdf; see also,
The Association for the Protection of Syrian Archaeology (APSA), http://www.apsa2011.com/index.php/en/provinces/
aleppo/great-umayyad-mosque.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2014). The footage from the October 2014 shows the interior
of the mosque being burnt.
21Nikolaus Pevsner, Breve Historia de la Arquitectura Europea at 109–110 (Alianza Forma, 1994).
22CHANNEL 4 NEWS, Syria: inside the Crac des Chevaliers crusader castle, (Mar. 31, 2014), available at https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v ¼ S9tqmxe4Ilw (last visited Dec. 10, 2014). The video shows the signs of the occupation by
Syrian rebel forces and the effects of the bombardment of the castle allegedly by Bashar forces.
23DGAM 2014 Report, supra note 20, at 19.
24Id. at 24.
25UNESCO, State of Conservation (SOC) Ancient City of Aleppo (Syrian Arab Republic): ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE
WORLD HERITAGE CENTRE, ICOMOS and ICCROM (2014), available at http://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/2914
26Editorial, Syria’s war: The new normal, THE ECONOMIST, Jul. 27, 2013.
27EURONEWS, Massive Explosion as ISIS destroys Jonah’s Tomb in Mosul (Jul. 25, 2014) available at https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v¼2qiZpndjg6Y.
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being destroyed by extremist groups’ intent on eradicating unique testimonies of the rich cultural
diversity of Syria.28
ISIS does not appear to be doing quite the same with artefacts of a movable nature, or that can
otherwise be removed. It has been claimed that the illicit trade with antiquities constitutes an
important source of income of the Islamic State,29 an issue that should be taken seriously in light
of the fact that since its split with al-Qaeda in February 2014, “IS[IS] has consolidated its
reputation as arguably the world’s most dangerous (and certainly its richest) jihadist terrorist
entity.”30 Against this backdrop, it is perhaps not a coincidence that the museum in Raqqa, the
capital city of the Islamic State and part of the World Heritage Tentative List, has been extensively
looted.31 However, until there is firsthand reporting and accounting at these sites, we may not
know for many years exactly what damage and destruction is being done and for what purpose.
2. SYRIA’S CULTURAL PROPERTY OBLIGATIONS
2.1. Under domestic law
The Syrian Antiquities Law, which was last amended in 1999,32 is divided into six chapters,
corresponding to general provisions, immovable antiquities, movable antiquities, excavations,
penalties and miscellaneous provisions. The law does not contemplate the derogation or
suspension of its obligations in exceptional circumstances. Therefore, the Syrian Antiquities Law
continues to apply during the current conflict.
The Syrian Antiquities Law is driven by the idea that cultural goods represent a public interest,
and is characterised by a strict retentive spirit and a highly punitive set of sanctions.33 Antiquities
are defined as movable and immovable property dating back at least 200 years (Article 1). With
very few exceptions,34 antiquities belong to the state and should be exhibited in museums.35
As such, the state retains the right to expropriate the antiquity or piece of land where the
archaeological site is situated, previous payment of a “suitable financial reward” in the case of
movable antiquities (Article 35) and compensation irrespective “of the archaeological, artistic or
historical value of the expropriated buildings and areas” to the owner (Article 20). In all
circumstances the state has the exclusive power to oversee the conservation, pertinent
modifications or archaeological excavations of the sites.36
The general export of antiquities seems to be altogether banned,37 as Article 69 provides that
an export license may only be granted with regard to antiquities that are to be exchanged with
museums and other scientific institutions, and with regard to antiquities given to an organisation
or mission after excavations are finished. This general ban extends to cultural objects that have
28See Common Statement, supra note 5, at 1.
29See Sam Hardy, How the West buys ‘conflict antiquities’ from Iraq and Syria (and funds terror), REUTERS
(27 Oct. 2014); see also The Syrian Campaign, Open Letter Calling on UN to Ban Trade in Syrian Artifacts, https://
diary.thesyriacampaign.org/un-ban-the-trade-in-syrian-antiquities/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2014). The letter urges the
Security Council to pass a resolution akin to the one in Iraq, S.C. Res. 1483, { 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22,
2003). It also engcourages the action “not only for the sake of protecting world heritage but also to reduce the
violence” since the sale of Syrian antiquities is fuelling the conflict. A ban of this sort is already in force in the
European Union pursuant to COUNCIL REGULATION 1332/2013, Amending Regulation (EU) No 36/2012 Concerning
Restrictive Measures in View of the Situation in Syria, 2013 O.J. (L 335/3) 11(c); ICOMOS, Emergency Red List of Syrian
Cultural Objects At Risk, available at http://icom.museum/uploads/tx_hpoindexbdd/ERL_SYRIE_EN.pdf.
30Andrew Phillips, The Islamic State’s challenge to international order, 68 Australian Journal Of International Affairs
495, 496 (2014).
31See UNESCO, Looting of museums and warehouses in Syria, available at http://www.unesco.org/new/en/
safeguarding-syrian-cultural-heritage/situation-in-syria/museums/
32Syrian Arab Republic, Ministry of Culture, DGAM, Antiquities Law, LEGISLATIVE DECREE n. 222 (Oct. 26, 1963). English
translation with all amendments available at http://portal.unesco.org/culture/fr/files/30606/11438206173Antiquities_
Law.pdf/Antiquities%2BLaw.pdf
33Id. Chapter 5.
34Id. articles 32 and 52. Foreign excavation missions licensed to work on Syrian soil likely to be covered by the
Euphrates Dam water are nonetheless entitled to half the discoveries, see amendment of the Legislative Decree n.
295, art. 1.
35See Articles 3–5, 20–21, 30, 52 of the Syrian Antiquities Law supra note 32.
36Id. articles 22, 39, 47–50.
37An earlier version of the Syrian Antiquities Law contained a chapter dedicated to trading antiquities, and another
to exporting them, but all their provisions were annulled by the last amendment carried out in 1999; see generally
Ammar Abdulrahman, The New Syrian Law on Antiquities, in Trade In Illicit Antiquities: The Destruction Of The World’s
Archaeological Heritage (Neil Brodie, et al., eds., 2001).
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been imported into the country (Article 33). Moreover, any relocation of antiquities within Syria’s
borders requires the permission of the pertinent authorities (Article 40).
Trade in antiquities, including selling pieces falsely representing they are antiquities, is forbidden
(Articles 57 and 58). However, the concept of “trade” is nowhere defined in the law. This leaves
open the question if the crime would encompass, for example, selling unimportant items which are
nonetheless antiquities for which “collectors are given permission from antiquities authorities to
dispense with” (Article 32) when the sale is made to a foreigner, or the object is meant to leave
the national territory, or if it would encompass selling antiquities within the national territory to
Syrian nationals. It is also unclear if the sanctions on trade are imposed on the seller, purchaser,
or both. None of the above are minor details in light of the 10 to 15 years of imprisonment, and
100,000 to 500,000 Syrian Pounds fine, that “trade in antiquities” carries (Article 57(c)).
There are two provisions in the prescriptive part directly relevant to the current armed conflict.
Article 7 prohibits, inter alia, destroying, transforming and damaging both movable and immovable
antiquities by writing on them, engraving on them, or changing their features. Article 26 bans
building military facilities within 500 meters of registered immovable archaeological and historical
properties. There seems to be a poor correspondence between the chapters that prescribe conduct
(1-4) and the one concerning sanctions (Chapter 5) since the latter introduces new forms of
prohibited behaviour (see section 3.3 below).
There is no preamble in the Syrian Antiquities Law explaining the motives behind its adoption,
at least not in its English version. Judging by its content, there is room to suspect that looting and
smuggling constituted generalised practices that were further made possible by the disinterest of
the authorities or, perhaps, their complicity. Hence, the relative disproportion of the sanctions for
smuggling in comparison with other violations (15–25 years as opposed to 1–3 years), and the
distribution of rewards to those who co-operate of their own free will, but also to those whose job
it is to co-operate. As a matter of fact, the law introduces the possibility of paying the police or
customs officials who help confiscate an antiquity with a reward of up to 20 percent of its value
(Article 72), and provides that 10 percent of the fines obtained have to be given to the officials
involved in the operation (Article 73). Ammar Abdulrahman partly confirms this theory. Concerning
the last amendment to the Syrian Antiquities Law in 1999, he notes that illicit excavations still
constituted a problem at that time in, for example, the so-called “Dead Cities.”38 These ancient
villages are so numerous and scattered that he says, “they can be guarded only at great cost.”39
Abdulrahman pointed to education in the values of the historical heritage of Syria as one essential
way to progressively eliminate illicit activities; as, in his own words, “it is obvious that no law,
however strict, can be fully effective without the willing cooperation of everyone involved.”40
While this is true, it is also important to remark that Syria is party to the 1970 Convention on the
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property41 and thus, if enforcement fails at the national level, there are other mechanisms
available that can help illicitly exported property return to its state of origin.
A new draft bill on antiquities was being prepared before the outbreak of the conflict that the
DGAM was expecting to present to the Parliament after December 2013.42 In line with the growing
international concern over world cultural heritage properties, the new draft features “a higher level
of legal protection for the sites inscribed on the World Heritage List;”43 a category that otherwise
receives the same treatment as any other cultural object in the current Syrian Antiquities Law
applicable to the armed conflict.
2.2. Under international law
There are three sets of rules that apply to Syria’s cultural property under international law in the
context of armed conflict. Those enshrined in the 1907 IV Hague Convention and Annexed
38Abdulrahman, supra note 37, at 111.
39Id.
40Id. at 113.
41Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of
Cultural Property, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, November 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S.
42DGAM, Completing new draft law on protection of Syrian archaeological heritage (Dec. 22, 2013), available at
http://www.dgam.gov.sy/index.php?d¼314&id¼1114
43Id.
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Regulations (1907 IV Hague Regulations),44 which represent customary international law;45 the basic
rules of the respect of cultural property in the 1954 Hague Convention;46 and the 1972 Convention
concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage Convention).47
2.2.1. Customary international law
Article 27 of the 1907 IV Hague Regulations states:
In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as
possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic
monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided
they are not being used at the time for military purposes.
It is the duty of the besieged to indicate the presence of such buildings or places by
distinctive and visible signs, which shall be notified to the enemy beforehand.48
Violations of the customary 1907 IV Hague Regulations incur individual criminal responsibility.49
The defence mounted by Slobodan Praljak at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) for his involvement in the destruction of the Mostar Bridge, was that the Bosnian
Muslims’ failure to provide “distinctive and visible signs” indicating the presence of protected
monuments relieved the Croatian army (Hrvatsko vijeće obrane or HVO) of its obligation to abide
by Article 27.50 The Trial Chamber, however, rejected this view, declaring that “le non-usage de ce
signe ne prive en aucun cas le bien de sa protection”.51 This issue would unlikely arise in
proceedings concerning violations against Syrian world cultural heritage given that these sites
belong to the World Heritage List and they bear the world heritage emblem. In fact, in the case
against Pavle Strugar concerning the Old Town of Dubrovnik, the ICTY Trial Chamber held that the
Old Town’s status as a UNESCO world heritage site proved the intent of the accused to
deliberately destroy cultural property.52
During occupation, under the 1907 IV Hague Regulations:
The property of municipalities, that of institutions dedicated to religion, charity and
education, the arts and sciences, even when State property, shall be treated as private
property. All seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions of this character,
historic monuments, works of art and science, is forbidden, and should be made the
subject of legal proceedings.53
The mention of “legal proceedings” in the second limb of the article is said to have been the
basis on which Wilhelm Keitel and Alfred Rosenberg were prosecuted at Nuremberg54 for their
involvement in the Einsatzstab Rosenberg, a Nazi educational research institute and museum
containing more than 21,000 artworks stolen from countries across occupied Europe. Keitel and
44Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulation concerning the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 187 C.T.S. 227.
45See e.g. Lawrence D. Egbert, Judicial Decisions: International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg), Judgment and
Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 248, 248-49 (1947); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, { 98 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
46Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for the
Execution of the Convention 1954, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240. Syria is also a party to the First Protocol of the
1954 Hague Convention devised to prevent the exportation of cultural property from occupied territories. See Protocol
to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 1954, May 14, 1954, 249
U.N.T.S. 358.
47World Heritage Convention supra note 4.
48Article 27, the 1907 IV Hague Regulations supra note 44.
49See Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra note 45, { 137.
50Prosecutor v. Prlic et al. Case No. IT-04-74-T, Judgment, { 177 (vol. 1) (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
May 29, 2013).
51Id. “The non-use of the emblem does not deprive the property of its protection under any circumstances” (own
translation); see also Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 3(d), May 25, 1993,
32 I.L.M. 1159 [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
52Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgment, { 329 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 31,
2005).
53Article 56, 1907 IV Hague Regulations supra note 44.
54Suzanne L. Schairer, The Intersection of Human Rights and Cultural Property Issues under International Law, 11
The Italian Yearbook Of International Law 59, 80 (2001); see also United Nations, Charter of the International Military
Tribunal - Annex to the Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European
Axis (“London Agreement”), art. 6(b), Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.C. 280.
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the chief of the institute, Rosenberg, were found guilty inter alia of the war crime of plunder. 55
These convictions on the basis of art theft were, until then, unprecedented,56 and demonstrate an
emergent will to award special treatment to cultural property per se.57
Indeed, the above provisions were chided for being over-inclusive. In the aftermath of the
Second World War, what was instead needed was “a convention of narrower application, so as to
render feasible a higher standard of protection”58 for cultural objects. Various states, including
Syria, subsequently gathered in The Hague under the aegis of UNESCO, and adopted the 1954
Hague Convention.
2.2.2. The 1954 Hague Convention
This Convention defines “cultural property” roughly as movables and immovables of great
importance to the cultural heritage of every people, understood as “every nation”.59 During
peacetime, state parties must adopt those measures they consider appropriate to safeguard
cultural property within their territory against the foreseeable effects of an armed conflict
(Article 3). It is not clear what general preventive measures Syria had in place before the war.
When Syria submitted its last implementation report of the Convention in 2010,60 plans to manage
its listed world heritage sites were largely absent.61 Cheikhmous Ali indicates that, after the
outbreak of hostilities, the Syrian Prime Minister issued a recommendation to take additional
measures such as the placing of alarm systems and surveillance cameras, because it was feared
that well-organised groups were going to engage in extensive looting; however, these precautions
were not fully implemented “[d]ue to the slow pace of bureaucracy.”62
Despite this apparent lack of planning and the difficulties of the DGAM to access archaeological
sites in hostile areas, it must be noted that spontaneous volunteer networks of ordinary Syrian
citizens are currently collaborating with local authorities to protect archaeological remains.63
However:
[these] activists and archeologists who are risking their lives on the ground to protect this
history . . . enter heritage sites and use techniques dating back to World War II to protect
them. They cover ancient mosaics with sandbags and dissemble sundials brick by brick in
order to hide them for reconstruction at a later date.64
In non-international armed conflicts such as the one in Syria, each warring party is bound to
respect, as a minimum, the obligations of Article 4.65 Parties are thus obliged to refrain (i) from
using cultural property as well as its surroundings in a way that is likely to expose it to damage or
destruction, and (ii) from directing any acts of hostility against such property (Article 4(1)).
For instance, the alleged take-over of the Citadel of Aleppo by the Syrian army in August 2012
would fall under the first limb of the article, and the air-raid over the castle of Crac des Chevaliers
in July 2013 under the second.66 However, it would be for a court of law to decide whether these
two examples constitute violations of the Convention since the above obligations may be lifted
“in cases where military necessity imperatively requires such a waiver” (Article 4(2)).67
55Egbert, supra note 45, at 282; see also Jacqueline Nowlan, Cultural Property and the Nuremberg War Crimes
Trial, 6 Humanitaeres Voelkerrecht 221, 221 (1993).
56Jadranka Petrovic, The Old Bridge Of Mostar And Increasing Respect For Cultural Property In Armed Conflict,
52 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012).
57Apart from Articles 27 and 56, the 1907 IV Hague Regulations contain other norms that are relevant – albeit
indirectly – to cultural and religious sites in Syria, such as the prohibition of pillage in Articles 28 and 47.
58Roger O’Keefe, The Protection Of Cultural Property In Armed Conflict, 101 (Cambridge University Press, 2006).
59See generally Roger O’Keefe, The Meaning of “Cultural Property under the 1954 Hague Convention, 55
Netherlands International Law Review 26 (1999).
60DGAM, Periodic Report on Implementation of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property
in The Event of Armed Conflict and its two (1954 and 1999) Protocols (2005–2010) (2010).
61Id. at 4.
62Ali, supra note 14, at 353-4.
63The work of some social networks is proving crucial in coordinating cooperation, documenting damage, and
denouncing the situation. See APSA, supra note 20, Le patrimoine archéologique syrien en danger, and Eyes on
Heritage.
64See The Syria Campaign, supra note 29.
65See The 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 46, art. 19(1).
66See CHANNEL 4 NEWS, Supra note 22.
67While the 1999 Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention (1999 Second Protocol) adopted in the
aftermath of the Balkan War provides a definition of this concept, Syria has signed, but not ratified, this instrument
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Article 4(3) directs the state, and the parties in the conflict in the case of non-international armed
conflict, to put a stop to any form of theft or any act of vandalism (emphasis added). Nevertheless,
Article 4(3) does not clarify if such control needs to be exercised with regard to the members of one’s
own armed forces or organised armed group, or if it extends to anyone perpetrating this sort of
behaviour, including the local population. This detail may be crucial to measuring the degree of
responsibility of each side of the conflict, in whose sight wholesale looting may be occurring.68
The last two obligations of Article 4 are more straightforward: reprisals against cultural property are
prohibited and the fact that a party has failed to adopt safeguarding measures does not relieve its
counterparties from its obligations under the Convention.69
2.3.3. Under the 1972 World Heritage Convention
It is usually said that the World Heritage Convention is a peacetime treaty. One essential rule of
the interpretation of treaties is that they must be understood “in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose.”70 The thrust behind the World Heritage Convention was to build an “effective
cooperative international framework”71 to protect cultural (and natural) heritage from potential
and/or specific threats, including those arising in wartime,72 which means that it also applies
during armed conflict.73
Even though Syria is party to the World Heritage Convention, appeals to stop the destruction of
Syria’s cultural heritage tend to focus on the 1954 Hague Convention exclusively.74 This one-sided
approach may be explained by the conviction that the 1954 Hague Convention represents lex
specialis in the protection of cultural property in armed conflict.75 However, as Jan Klabbers puts it,
the principle of lex specialis comes with a number of methodological issues such as the lack of
criteria to determine which treaty is the special one, and which is the general one.76 These
methodological issues are put into the spotlight with regard to the protection of world heritage
sites in armed conflict. Although the 1954 Hague Convention is designed for the protection of
cultural property in armed conflict, the World Heritage Convention is the only treaty dealing with
world cultural heritage,77 rendering both treaties special.
Footnote continued
and thus is not bound by such definition; see Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 1999, art. 6, Mar. 26, 1999. 2253 U.N.T.S. 212.
68On this point, Patty Gerstenblith argues that a systematic and historical reading of this article supports the view
that armed forces and groups are required to control the behaviour of only their own personnel. See Patty
Gerstenblith, Protecting Cultural Heritage in Armed Conflict: Looking Back, Looking Forward, 7 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y &
Ethics J. 677, 693 (2009); see also Patty Gerstenblith, From Bamiyan to Baghdad: Warfare and the Preservation of
Cultural Heritage at the Beginning of the 21st Century, 37 GEO. J. INT’L L. 249, 309 (2006); see also Craig Forrest,
International Law and the Protection of Cultural Heritage (Routledge, 2010), 91-2. However, in case of belligerent
occupation, the obligation would extend to the members of the local population as well. See Catherine Phuong,
The Protection of Iraqi Cultural Property, 53 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 985, 987 (2004).
69Paragraphs 4 and 5 of article 4, 1954 Hague Convention supra note 46.
70VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (emphasis added).
71Conférence Générale, Opportunite D’etablir UN Instrument International Concernant La Protection Des
Monuments Et Des Sites De Valeur Universelle, { 2 (UNESCO Doc. 16C/19, Juillet 31, 1970).
72UNESCO, ETUDE PRELIMINAIRE SUR LES ASPECTS JURIDIQUE ET TECHNIQUES D’UNE REGLEMENTATION INTERNATIONALE EVENTUELLE SUR LA
PROTECTION DES MONUMENT ET DES SITES DE VALEUR UNIVERSELLE, U.N. Doc. 166 EX/28 (Mar. 12, 2003), UNESCO DOC 16C/19 ANNEX
{ 2, 54 & 79.
73Other scholars support this contention, see e.g., Guido Carducci, The 1972 World Heritage Convention in the
framework of other UNESCO conventions on cultural heritage, in The 1972 World Heritage Convention: A Commentary
(Francesco Francioni ed., 2008), 365; Forrest, supra note 68, at 392; O’Keefe, supra note 58, at 312.
74See e.g., Common Statement, supra note 5, at 2; see also UNESCO, UNESCO Director-General condemns military
presence and destruction at World Heritage Sites in Syria, Feb. 20, 2014, available at http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/
1108/; UNESCO, UNESCO Director-General deplores continuing destruction of ancient Aleppo, a World Heritage Site,
Apr. 24, 2014, available at http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single-view/news/unesco_di
rector_general_deplores_continuing_destruction_of_ancient_aleppo_a_world_heritage_site/#.VJhRmsDn4.
75See e.g., Caroline Ehlert, Prosecuting The Destruction Of Cultural Property In International Criminal Law: With A
Case Study On The Khmer Rouge’s Destruction Of Cambodia’s Heritage, 61 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014).
76Jan Klabbers, Beyond the Vienna Convention: Conflicting Treaty Provisions, in The Law Of Treaties Beyond The
Vienna Convention 199 (Enzo Cannizzaro ed., 2011).
77The World Heritage Convention also deals with world natural heritage. However, these two categories
traditionally benefit from different regimes above all in armed conflict, see e.g., Britta Sjöstedt, The Role of Multilateral
Environmental Agreements in Armed Conflict: ‘Green-keeping’ in Virunga Park. Applying the UNESCO World Heritage
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The World Heritage Convention defines “cultural heritage” roughly as monuments, groups of
buildings and sites of outstanding universal value.78 This threshold of importance is higher than
that required for cultural property (i.e., great importance to the cultural heritage of every nation),
for which all Syrian world cultural heritage is by default entitled, at least, to the protection of the
1954 Hague Convention. Nevertheless, the World Heritage Convention also contains provisions on
obligations during armed conflict. Under Article 6(3), states must refrain from taking any deliberate
measures which might damage, directly or indirectly, the world cultural heritage situated on the
territory of another state party.
In the context of armed conflict, it is submitted that the prohibition enshrined in Article 6(3) of
the Convention encompasses, at least, four different types of measures, namely: (i) direct attacks;
(ii) use of cultural sites that might lead to their direct harm; (iii) attacks aimed at another objective
but that might harm those sites indirectly; (iv) use of the surroundings of cultural heritage sites
that may cause them indirect damage. In Syria, however, the harm done to world cultural heritage
has occurred within its own borders. Thus, attention must be paid primarily to Article 4, according
to which:
Each State Party to this Convention recognizes that the duty of ensuring the identification,
protection, conservation, presentation and transmission to future generations of the cultural
and natural heritage . . . situated on its territory, belongs primarily to that State.79
Article 4 does not elaborate on the meaning of “protection” or “conservation.” According to
the rules of the interpretation of international law, when a treaty provision leaves its meaning
open to the extent that the choice renders it effective or ineffective, “it is reasonable to opt for
a meaningful rather than for a meaningless interpretation.”80 In addition, a trend exists in
international law that tries to level the regimes of protection in international and non-international
armed conflicts.81 Therefore, the most appropriate way to render the obligation of “protection” and
“conservation” of world cultural heritage effective during non-international armed conflict is to
interpret Article 4 by analogy with Article 6(3). This means that, just as in international armed
conflicts, a ban exists regarding at least the four types of measures mentioned above when they
are deliberate, a concept that, just like the imperative military necessity in the 1954 Hague
Convention, is left undefined.
It is important to note that Articles 6(3) and 4 of the World Heritage Convention do not reduce
its scope of protection to listed world heritage sites. As a result, there is a strong presumption that
the obligations of these provisions also apply to the twelve Syrian sites on the Tentative List. This
protection could also be extended to other monuments, groups of buildings or sites when it could
be successfully argued that they are of outstanding universal value.
3. PROSPECTS OF CRIMINAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND JUSTICE FOR VIOLATIONS AGAINST
SYRIAN WORLD CULTURAL HERITAGE
3.1. Pursuant to the 1954 Hague Convention
The wish to introduce mandatory punishment for individuals damaging, destroying or plundering
cultural property was a key motivation82 behind the 1954 Hague Convention:
. . . the High Contracting Parties undertake to take, within the framework of their ordinary
criminal jurisdiction, all necessary steps to prosecute and impose penal or disciplinary
Footnote continued
Convention in the Armed Conflict of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 82 Nordic Journal Of International Law
129 (2013).
78See The World Heritage Convention,supra note 4, art. 1; see also THE OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE WORLD HERITAGE CONVENTION, { 49–53 (UNESCO Doc. WHC 13/01, July 2013), avaliable at http://whc.unesco.org/archi
ve/opguide13-en.pdf
79Article 4, World Heritage Convention supra note 4.
80Carlo Focarelli, Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Soap Bubble?, 21 European Journal Of
International Law 125, 130 (2010).
81Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 239, 261 (2000). The 1999 Second
Protocol and the Statute of the International Criminal Court attest to this trend in the realm of cultural property as
both award cultural property the same level of protection in both international and non-international armed conflicts.
82Roger O’Keefe, Protection of Cultural Property under International Criminal Law, 11 Melbourne Journal Of
International Law 339, 359 (2010); see also Jiri Toman, THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE EVENT OF
ARMED CONFLICT (Dartmouth, UNESCO 1996), at 292.
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sanctions upon those persons, of whatever nationality, who commit or order to be
committed a breach of the present Convention.83
This section shows that, due to the poor implementation of this provision and the doubts
surrounding its scope and interpretation, the prospects of holding someone accountable for acts
against world cultural heritage in the conflict in Syria pursuant to the 1954 Hague Convention are
far from realisable.
There is a generalised lack of implementation of the above article into the domestic legal orders
of state parties to the 1954 Hague Convention.84 Unfortunately, Syria falls into this pattern of
passivity. According to the last implementation report, despite the reform that its criminal laws
underwent in 1996, the 1949 Syrian Criminal Code lacks criminal sanctions in this regard.85 Syria is
thus not ready to prosecute suspected perpetrators on the basis of the 1954 Hague Convention.
There could be the possibility of subjecting suspects to trial in the domestic fora of foreign state
parties pursuant to the principle of universal criminal jurisdiction, a principle that allows states to
bring criminal proceedings against individuals regardless of the nationality of the suspect or the
territory where he or she allegedly committed the crime. Indeed, the 1954 Hague Convention
allows the trial of persons “of whatever nationality” that have committed a violation of the
Convention.86 However, as Roger O’Keefe points out, it is open to question whether this amounts
to establishing universal criminal jurisdiction.87 This is because, although the “provision expressly
states that such offences are to be punishable whatever the nationality of the offender, [it] does
not advance . . . whether this includes offences committed by non-nationals outside the territory
of the forum state.”88 Based on the preparatory works of the Convention, O’Keefe argues that the
provision allows but does not oblige a party to exercise universal jurisdiction over its breaches.89
The lack of the mandatory establishment of universal jurisdiction over offences of the Convention
affects the chances of prosecuting suspected perpetrators in any country other than Syria.
Even if the above hurdles did not exist, the fact that the situation in Syria amounts to a non-
international armed conflict brings another interpretative issue. This is because in non-international
armed conflicts, parties are only obliged to apply the obligations of Article 4, whereas it is in
Article 28 that the 1954 Hague Convention spells out the obligation to prosecute and impose
criminal sanctions.90 In O’Keefe’s view, the better interpretation is to regard Article 28 as a
necessary secondary rule attached to the primary obligation of Article 4.91 All in all, however, the
overall lack of implementation coupled with that of clarity makes Article 28 a “dead letter” for
current Syrian purposes.
3.2. Under the 1972 World Heritage Convention
The attempts to criminalise breaches against world cultural heritage gained momentum with the
destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan in 2001.92 This act was labelled a “crime against culture,”93
and later gave rise to the notion of “crimes against the common heritage of humanity.”94
83Article 28 of the 1954 Hague Convention supra note 46.
84See UNESCO, Report on the implementation of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its two 1954 and 1999 Protocols, Report on the Activities from 1995 to
2004, 20 (Paris: UNESCO Doc. CLT-2005/WS/6), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001407/
140792e.pdf.
85Id at 4.
86See article 28, 1954 Hague Convention supra note 46.
87O’Keefe, supra note 82, at 360.
88Id. at 361 (emphasis added).
89Id. 362; see M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections on Criminal Jurisdiction in International Protection of Cultural
Property, 10 Syracuse J. INT’L L. & COM. 281, 312 (1983) (criticising back then that the universality principle has not
been recognised with regard to crimes concerning cultural property); however, the 1996 DRAFT CODE OF CRIMES AGAINST THE
PEACE AND SECURITY OF MANKIND (1996) prepared by the International Law Commission foresees universal criminal
jurisdiction for crimes concerning cultural objects. See DRAFT CODE OF CRIMES AGAINST THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF MANKIND, arts.
8&20(e)(4), 51 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532, at 14 (July 26, 1996).
90See the 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 46, art. 19(1); see O’Keefe, supra note 82, at 361-362; see also
REPORT OF THE GROUP OF EXPERTS FOR CAMBODIA ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 52/135, { 76, U.N. DOC.52/135
(1999).
91See O’Keefe, supra note 82, at 361–362.
92See generally Francesco Francioni & Federico Lenzerini, supra note 10.
93See Bandarin, supra note 10.
94See generallyUNESCO Doc., WHC-01/CONF.208/23.
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Francesco Bandarin, then Director of the World Heritage Centre, commented at the time: “[t]his is a
far-reaching concept, which firmly places cultural and natural heritage within the reach of
international law, and has implications that go beyond Bamyan.”95 In fact, although the World
Heritage Convention lacks any explicit reference to individual criminal responsibility, or any
secondary norms for that matter, the then UNESCO Director-General, Koichiro Matsuura affirmed that
the destruction of the Buddhas granted an examination of “all the means available to prevent and
punish crimes against cultural properties within other existing conventions.”96 Those responsible for
the implementation of the World Heritage Convention took the hint. The Chair of the World Heritage
Committee declared that such a tragedy showed that “the application of the World Heritage
Convention need[ed] to be reviewed to give it more ‘teeth’ to deal with wanton destruction of World
Heritage.”97
The general outcry over the loss of the Buddhas led to the adoption of the 2003 UNESCO
Declaration concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage (2003 UNESCO
Declaration)98 which contains the following provision:
States should take all appropriate measures, in accordance with international law, to
establish jurisdiction over, and provide effective criminal sanctions against, those persons
who commit, or order to be committed, acts of intentional destruction of cultural heritage
of great importance for humanity, whether or not it is inscribed on a list maintained by
UNESCO or another international organization.99
This confirms that individual criminal responsibility represents an alternative to deal with the
intentional destruction of world heritage sites protected under the World Heritage Convention.
Although declarations are “resorted to only in very rare cases relating to matters of major and
lasting importance where maximum compliance is expected,”100 nothing indicates that Syria or any
other parties bound by the World Heritage Convention have debated or introduced these offences
into their domestic legal orders. Perhaps the 2003 UNESCO Declaration should have taken
advantage of the rare occasion which triggered its adoption and used it as an opportunity to
specify in solemn manner, not that states had an obligation to introduce criminal sanctions (that
already existed), but how this obligation should be implemented. For example, given that its
preamble starts by saying that the destruction of the Buddhas “affected the international
community as a whole,” Article VII could have proposed the establishment of universal criminal
jurisdiction and an obligation to prosecute or extradite suspects of acts of destruction. Section 4
proposes to re-appraise the idea of crimes against common cultural heritage along these lines.
3.3. Domestic Courts – the Syrian Antiquities Law
Under the Syrian Antiquities Law, all offences carry imprisonment plus additional fines, for which it
would be for criminal (and perhaps military) courts101 to hear cases concerning Syrian world
heritage sites.102 But to what extent can the Syrian Antiquities Law and its courts express the fact
and the degree of the wrongdoing,103 and to what extent can they deliver justice?
Removing “ruins, stones, or soil from an archaeological place without permission” is punishable
with one month to two years of imprisonment and additional fines under Article 62(d). This
provision would encompass looting and thus a major source of the deterioration of Syrian world
heritage.
95See Bandarin, supra note 10, at 1.
96.Id, at 1–2.
97Interview with Peter King, Chair of the World Heritage Committee, WORLD HERITAGE NEWSLETTER (UNESCO WORLD
HERITAGE CENTRE), MAY-JUN. 2001, at 2, available at http://whc.unesco.org/documents/publi_news_30_en.pdf
98UNESCO Declaration concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage, Oct. 17, 2003.
99Id. article VII.
100Report of the Commission on Human Rights, United Nations document E/3616/Rev. l, { 105, 18th session,
Economic and Social Council (19 March-14 April 1962) United Nations, New York.
101The Syrian Antiquities Law also provides that the person responsible for the offence against a cultural object
must return it or, if it has been destroyed or it has disappeared, s/he must pay compensation in addition to the fine.
The rules of restitution and compensation would be presumably enforced by a civil court (see Articles 65 and 68).
102See generally Chapter 5 of the Syrian Antiquities Law supra note 32.
103Addressing this question with regard to the ICTY and ICC Statutes, see generally Micaela Frulli, The
Criminalization of Offences Against Cultural Heritage in Times of Armed Conflict: The Quest for Consistency,
22 European Journal Of International Law 203 (2010); see also, Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law
(5th ed., Oxford University Press 2006), 20.
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Damage and destruction is prohibited in Article 7 (mentioned earlier) and sanctioned with five to
ten years of imprisonment plus fines (Article 58(a)). Article 7 does not contemplate any exception
for which the Syrian Antiquities Law espouses, in principle, a stricter standard than those of
international law, where the damage and destruction of cultural property may be justified, for
example, by imperative military necessity.
Violations of Article 26, which, as mentioned above, bans building military facilities within 500
meters of registered immovable archeological and historical properties, entails one to three years
of imprisonment plus fines (Article 59(a)). However, it must be noted that this provision uses the
term “building” a military facility, rather than “placing.” As such, it is not clear if this would
encompass temporary installations such as garrison stations and military camps like those on the
site of Palmyra, “qui est devenue une base militaire de l’armée du régime.”104
Related types of conduct, such as the parking of tanks and rocket launchers inside and around
the Old Citadel of Aleppo and Palmyra105 would fall within Article 62(e), which punishes with one
to two years of imprisonment the use of “registered historical buildings for purposes different from
those for which they were intended” (emphasis added). It is expected that the court called to
apply this provision draws a distinction between the original and current purposes since, as Ali
highlights, historical places such as Crac des Chevaliers, the Citadel of Aleppo and Palmyra have
resumed since 2011 the strategic military role they played in medieval times.106
In sum, although important interpretative challenges remain open, in principle, Syrian domestic
courts would be able to prosecute the majority of, if not all, conduct that has directly endangered
Syrian world heritage (i.e., the fact of the wrongdoing), even though not qua world heritage
(of outstanding universal value)107 but as any other antiquity. The higher degree of the gravity of
the crime against world cultural heritage is not reflected in the definition of the crime either and,
sometimes, would not be able to be reflected in its punishment. For example, the just mentioned
Article 58(a), which foresees five to ten years of imprisonment, requires imposing the maximum
penalty when the damaged or destroyed antiquity belongs to the state, which is almost always.
Hence the punishment concerning a local mosque would be the same as that concerning Crac des
Chevaliers, or Aleppo’s souq.
An examination of who would stand trial for acts against world heritage is relevant to know the
extent to which Syrian courts would be able to deliver justice in general terms. The Syrian
Antiquities Law reads:
A penalty equal to that of the perpetrator is given to anyone whose legal responsibility is
to protect antiquities or control the crimes mentioned in this Law, if they knew or were told
of such crimes and failed to take the appropriate measures in order to control them.108
Those responsible for protecting antiquities under the Syrian Antiquities Law are the members of
the DGAM (Article 2). While the DGAM has shown commitment since the beginning of the armed
conflict to report on the situation and carry out its tasks within the limits of the possible,109 its
neutrality has been called into question by some: “they have revealed only partial information in
agreement with the regime’s propaganda offensive.”110 Ali further points out, for example, that they
have not requested the Syrian army to ensure the protection of sites such as Apamea or Palmyra,
and that some of the statements where the DGAM reassured that Syrian museums were well
protected have proven untrue.111 But this is all open to question.
104“That has become a military base of the regime” (own translation). Interview with Cheikhmous Ali, (Mar. 26,
2014), available at http://www.lesclesdumoyenorient.com/Entretien-avec-Cheikhmous-Ali-Le.html.
105Id. at 18; see also Ali supra note 14 at 358.
106Ali, supra note 104.
107See article 1, World Heritage Convention supra note 4.
108Article 63, Syrian Antiquities Law supra note 32.
109See e.g., UNESCO Regional Training, supra note 15; Recently, the DGAM further issued an international appeal for
international co-operation given “the increasing magnitude of the danger threatening the Syrian cultural heritage was
beyond [its] capabilities to contain alone.” See Maamoun AbdulKarim, Syrian Cultural Heritage. Three and a Half
Years of Suffering (Damascus: DGAM, Jul. 21, 2014) 1, available at http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/
HQ/CLT/pdf/Statement_DGAM_July_2014_01.pdf.
110Ali, supra note 14, at 358; see also Salam Al Quntar, Syrian Cultural Property in the Crossfire: Reality and
Effectiveness of Protection Efforts, 1 Journal Of Eastern Mediterranean Archaeology And Heritage Studies 348, 350
(2014).
111Ali, supra note 14, at 358–359.
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The doctrine of command responsibility, according to which a person is not relieved from
criminal responsibility when he knew or had reason to know that his de jure or de facto
subordinates had committed crimes and nevertheless failed to “take the necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators,”112 could and should also be
applicable in the context of Article 63.113 This would bring into the picture higher-ranking officials
in the chain of command of both the Syrian army and the rebel militias.
An important weakness should be mentioned. The Syrian criminal courts would only be able to
return to their normal function after the conflict is over and when an authority is established or
reinstated into power. As long as these cases are handled on Syrian territory by Syrian nationals,
there is room to suspect that “victor’s justice” would prevail and a large number of violations
against world heritage sites would thus be overlooked.114
3.4. Syrian Extraordinary Tribunal – the Chautauqua Blueprint
Given the unfeasibility of having the Syrian case brought before the International Criminal Court
(ICC),115 a group of international experts began discussing possible alternatives, which led to the
preparation of a “discussion draft of a Statute for a Syrian Extraordinary Tribunal to Prosecute
Atrocity Crimes.”116 The final document was signed on 27 August 2013 and is known as
the “Chautauqua Blueprint.” The Syrian Extraordinary Tribunal would complement the work of
domestic criminal courts by focusing on those most responsible for atrocity crimes.
Although the Tribunal intends to prosecute perpetrators on all sides of the conflict when the
political situation permits, given that it would sit in Damascus and its judges would be predominantly
of Syrian nationality,117 the degree to which it could deliver justice may be called into question in the
same terms as the Syrian domestic courts. Cases may only be brought against the defeated and
“the involvement of victors in the prosecution . . . could result in biased and unfair trials.”118
Turning to its capacity of expressing the fact of the wrongdoing and its degree, the potential
Tribunal would have jurisdiction over war crimes consisting of:
Intentionally directing attacks against buildings [that are] dedicated to religion education,
art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the
sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives.119
This article is unsatisfactory on three grounds outlined below. It must be noted that some of such
criticisms have already been voiced by Micaela Frulli insofar as the Chautauqua Blueprint
reproduces word-by-word the crime against cultural objects of the ICC Statute.120
First, the definitions and list of objects the Blueprint comprises in this war crime is far behind
any current concept of cultural property, let alone that of world heritage sites.121 As Frulli notes,
this list of objects regresses to the provisions of the 1907 IV Hague Regulations, as they include
112See Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, { 331 & 343 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Nov. 16, 1998) [hereinafter “The Celebici Case”].
113Guénaël Mettraux, The Law of Command Responsibility 98 (Oxford University Press, 2009). While traditionally
connected to acts defined as war crimes, “the principle of command responsibility applies, in principle, and has been
made to apply, to crimes such as genocide or crimes against humanity which do not require any linkage with an
armed conflict.”
114See Annika Jones, Seeking International Criminal Justice in Syria, 89 International Law Studies 802, 813 (2013),
with regard to the potential Internationalised Tribunal on the grounds that victors would be involved in the
prosecution of the defeated.
115Syria is not party to the ICC Statute, the Security Council Draft Resolution, U.N. Doc. S/2014/348 of 22 May 2014
which sought to defer the situation in Syria to the ICC was vetoed by Russia and China. Alternative modes for the ICC
to gain jurisdiction over Syria also seem unlikely at the time of writing, see Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, art. 12, July 17, 1993, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter ICC Statute].
116Chautauqua Blueprint, supra note 9.
117Id. at 1.
118Jones, supra note 114, at 813.
119The text corresponds to Article 20(d)(4) - applicable in non-international armed conflicts, and also to Article 20
(b)(10) – applicable in international armed conflicts of the Chautauqua Blueprint supra note 9.
120Frulli, supra note 103, at 207–211 (the author rightly chides the ICC Statute for following what she calls a
civilian-use approach, as opposed to a more specific cultural-value approach which would better reflect the gravity of
the crime): see also PETROVIC, supra note 56, at 211–230 (examining the ICTY’s approach to Cultural Property).
121The definition of “cultural property” enshrined in the 1954 Hague Convention denotes objects of importance to
every nation, see supra notes 46 and 59; and world cultural heritage needs to be of “outstanding universal value” to
qualify as such, see article 1 of the World Heritage Convention, supra note 4.
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“historic monuments together with hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are
collected.”122 This also means that the list does not require a threshold of importance, and thereby
it covers every historic monument and place of worship regardless of whether they are important
for humanity, a nation, a city, or solely a local community. As mentioned in their analysis, the
1907 IV Hague Regulations were indeed deemed inadequate by the end of the Second World War
for being over-inclusive. This issue was tackled to some extent in Jokic,123 a case before the ICTY,
which also involved the shelling of the Old Town of Dubrovnik. The Trial Chamber noted that the
Old Town’s belonging to the World Heritage List granted it a special status that had “been taken
into consideration in the definition and evaluation of the gravity of the crime.”124 Since in the
practice of the ICTY, “sentences must reflect the inherent gravity of the totality of the criminal
conduct of the accused,”125 it is difficult to determine the extent to which the special legal status
of this world heritage site increased the defendant’s conviction.
Second, while the gist of all cultural property regulation is that these objects deserve a
treatment sitting over and above that of civilian objects,126 the Chautauqua Blueprint fails to
recognise such a difference. The general rule for the protection of civilian property is that it may
not be attacked unless it has been turned into a military objective.127 The same exception applies
under the Chautauqua Blueprint for historic monuments, places of worship and the like: directing
attacks against cultural buildings is not a war crime if they are military objectives. Hence, the
bombardment of Crac des Chevaliers and its subsequent partial destruction would go unpunished
inasmuch as it is proved that Syrian rebels were housed inside and the attack provided a definite
military advantage to the Syrian army.
Third, and connected to the previous point, the Chautauqua Blueprint does not encompass the
full range of acts that may be otherwise regarded as a violation against cultural property, let alone
world cultural heritage. For one thing, the Blueprint does not cover acts of looting against cultural
objects128 and, judging by the images that show sites such as Apamea before and after the
conflict just to name one example,129 this is a significant omission. In addition, the use of cultural
institutions for military purposes is not included in the definition of the crime. Not criminalising
“the conduct of those who transformed the very same property into a military objective,” is an
important blind spot.130 Indeed, this way, impunity under the Chautauqua Blueprint may come full
circle: the Syrian rebels who allegedly occupied Crac des Chevaliers and turned it into a military
objective cannot be held accountable, nor can the members of the Syrian army who reportedly
bombed the world heritage site on the basis that it had been turned into a military objective.
In conclusion, the coupling of a would-be Extraordinary Syrian Tribunal and the Syrian domestic
courts promises a multi-layered approach to seeking justice, but not a comprehensive one. If the
suspicion of victor’s justice materialises, a good deal of the violations committed would be
overlooked. Both the Syrian Antiquities Law and the Chautauqua Blueprint, being blind to the
existence of world cultural heritage, are incapable of expressing the gravity embedded in acts
against it. The capacity to express the fact of the wrongdoing is further compromised under the
Chautauqua Blueprint, since looting and the use of cultural heritage for military purposes is not
part of the war crime; something particularly regrettable in light of the fact that the Syrian
Extraordinary Tribunal would be expected to hear high-profile cases such as those involving world
heritage. This also means that Syrian ordinary and extraordinary tribunals would work on an
asymmetrical basis: low-level perpetrators would be prosecuted for a wider range of crimes in the
122Frulli, supra note 103, at 211.
123See Prosecutor v. Jokic, Case No. IT-01-42/1-S, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 18 2004).
124Id.at { 67.
125Strugar, supra note 52 at { 459 (emphasis added).
126TOMAN, supra note 82, at 57.
127See PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS (PROTOCOL I), art. 52(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; See
Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law: Volume I Rules Ch. 2
(Cambridge University Press, 2005); see also Chautauqua Blueprint, supra note 9, art. 20(b)(2).
128Instead, wholesale looting may in Syria fall under more generic offences, such as “pillaging a town or a place”
in Article 20(d)(5) of the Chautauqua Blueprint, and “[d]estroying or seizing the property of an adversary, unless such
destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of the conflict” in Article 20(d)(12). See
Chautauqua Blueprint, supra note 9.
129Casana & Panahipour, supra note 18, at 131-2.
130Frulli, supra note 103, at 215.
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Syrian domestic courts in comparison to high-level perpetrators standing trial at the Extraordinary
Tribunal pursuant to the Chautauqua Blueprint.
4. THE CRIME AGAINST COMMON CULTURAL HERITAGE: A RE-APPRAISAL
The increase in the prospects of criminal accountability has been a driving force behind the
adoption of international laws for the protection of cultural heritage.131 Among the various cultural
property international treaties, the World Heritage Convention stands out for having recognised the
exceptional category of world cultural heritage, and for having made the obligation to protect
world cultural heritage an almost-universal obligation via its 191 state parties.132 As argued by
Francesco Francioni and Federico Lenzerini,133 and confirmed by the 2003 UNESCO Declaration,
failure to protect this heritage constitutes a violation of international law and should entail the
criminal responsibility of individuals. In line with its unique value, the international community
likewise distinguishes between damage caused to world heritage sites in Syria from the rest of its
cultural objects, as illustrated in the introduction. Yet, mapping the different venues that seek
criminal accountability for these acts in the Syrian context reveals that crimes concerning cultural
objects may only be prosecuted under the Syrian Antiquities Law and the Chautauqua Blueprint;
and none of them is capable of either fully expressing the fact and degree of the wrongdoing, or
rendering justice broadly understood.
Thus, a gap exists concerning criminal accountability for acts leading to the damage and
destruction of world heritage sites and similar cultural heritage of great importance to humanity.
As mentioned earlier, this was first noticed after the destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan, a
kind of act that was unprecedented in 2001. Now that we live in a period when danger to world
cultural heritage is deliberate and systematic, the gap not only exists, it has also grown wider.
Therefore, the idea of crimes against common cultural heritage should be re-introduced.134
Although the 2003 UNESCO Declaration helped to instil the notion of such crime, any future
debate has to move beyond its parameters. Indeed, the 2003 UNESCO Declaration presented
important limitations in terms of both substance and form. The Declaration constituted, as is
usually the case with international cultural heritage instruments, an ad hoc reaction to a particular
event. As a matter of substance, its content was reduced to the specificities of the Bamiyan
episode and the offence enshrined in its Article VII is incapable of encompassing the actual range
of violations against world cultural heritage. For example, the actus reus of “acts of intentional
destruction” excludes the unlawful use of cultural heritage, and would also seem to exclude acts
intended to cause “damage,”135 such as the use of stone statues in al-Qatora as training targets or
occasional looting. Concerning the mens rea, Article II(2) of the 2003 UNESCO Declaration states
that “intentional destruction” corresponds to an “act intended to destroy.” Hence, Article VII would
not appear to cover destruction occasioned recklessly or indirectly in the course of hostilities. As a
matter of form, the 2003 UNESCO Declaration phrases as a recommendation what was already
obligatory under Article 28 of the 1954 Hague Convention.136 Given that international criminal law
131One of the first documents presented at the International Conferences on the Drafting of the 1954 Hague
Convention was by Georges Berlia entitled, Report on the International Protection of Cultural Property, by Penal
Measures, in the Event of Armed Conflict, Conflict (UNESCO Doc 5 C/PRG/6 Annex I, Mar. 8, 1950); see O’Keefe, supra
note 82, at 359; see also e.g., Additional Protocol I supra note 127, art. 85(4)(d) applicable in international armed
conflicts; see 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, supra note 89,art. 20(e)(iv); and
(not applicable to Syria) 1999 Second Protocol, supra note 67, art. 15–16.
132The only States not parties to the World Heritage Convention, as of October 2014 are Somalia, Tuvalu,
East Timor, the Republic of Nauru, Lichtenstein and South Sudan. See States Parties: Ratification Status, available at
http://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/.
133Francioni & Lenzerini, supra note 10, at 645.
134I prefer the expression “crimes against common cultural heritage” as opposed to “crimes against the common
heritage of humanity” because the latter may lead to confusion with the concept of common heritage of mankind;
see generally, Kemal Baslar, The Concept of The Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff,
1998).
135The concept of “intentional destruction” in the sense of the 2003 UNESCO Declaration comprises acts aimed at
destroying cultural heritage “in whole or in part”, see 2003 UNESCO Declaration, supra note 98, art. II(2).
136This criticism has been raised by Lyndell V. Prott, UNESCO International Framework for the Protection of the
Cultural Heritage, in Cultural Heritage Issues: The Legacy Of Conquest, Colonization And Commerce 278–279 (James
A.R. Nafziger & Ann M. Nicgorski eds., 2009); and by Federico Lenzerini, The UNESCO Declaration Concerning the
Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage: One Step Forward and Two Steps Back, 13 The Italian Yearbook Of
International Law 141 (2003).
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was more developed by 2003 than in 1954, the Declaration could have instead used Article VII to
include explicit guidelines on how to implement such an obligation.
For the sake of triggering the debate, a way to effectively establish crimes against common
cultural heritage is briefly suggested here: the World Heritage Committee, the body in charge of
implementing the World Heritage Convention, could include this matter on its agenda, perhaps
following a previous discussion by the UNESCO General Conference, and eventually adopt a more
comprehensive definition of the crime avoiding the loopholes mentioned above. It could also
make clear that, as Francioni and Lenzerini pointed out, this offence should be prosecuted on the
basis of universal criminal jurisdiction.137 The decisions of the World Heritage Committee are
reflected in the Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention
(Operational Guidelines) which, despite not being mentioned in the World Heritage Convention,
state parties accept as binding.138 Basing the crime against common cultural heritage in the World
Heritage Convention would allow its prosecution irrespective of whether it is committed during
wartime or peacetime, and introducing it through the Operational Guidelines would offer some
guarantees that state parties incorporate the crime into their domestic criminal systems.
CONCLUSION
International criminal law is typically regarded as being in its infancy. However, the fact that this is
common knowledge should not deter the exercise of identifying and assessing the specific gaps
that exist between international criminal law and conventional obligations. This article has shown
that the legal bases for prosecuting individuals for violations of the 1954 Hague Convention and
the World Heritage Convention are largely absent. Those responsible may be prosecuted under the
Syrian Antiquities Law, a law that was presumably approved independently of those conventions
and hence present a number of caveats explained above. If the Chautauqua Blueprint is
successful, it would turn a blind eye to three major causes of damage (viz. looting, use for military
purposes, attacks against sites that constitute military objectives) allowing those behind this
vicious circle of violations to “walk away.”
This is especially frustrating if one takes into consideration that the driving force behind the
adoption of conventional laws for the protection of cultural property has mostly been motivated by
a desire to hold individuals accountable. The accountability gap shown in the case of Syria should
serve those involved in the implementation of cultural heritage laws (e.g., UNESCO, the World
Heritage Committee at the international level) as a warning that the 2003 UNESCO Declaration, or
any other instrument before that, did not manage to have consequences for Bamiyan or beyond.
Although this article focused on the case of Syria, one may also be able to identify a
“Bamiyanisation” phenomenon, that is, a wave of iconoclasm spanning North Africa and the
Arab region. This should provide another, and hopefully the last momentum to fully develop and
implement the crime against common cultural heritage that so far only exists at the conceptual
level.
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